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PARADOXICAL AND LESS PARADOXICAL 
EFFECTS OF THOUGHT SUPPRESSION:
A CRITICAL REVIEW
 
Eric Rassin, Harald Merckelbach, and Peter Muris
 
Maastricht University
 
ABSTRACT.
 
The process of consciously trying to avoid certain thoughts is referred to as
thought suppression. Experimental research has documented that thought suppression may have
paradoxical effects in that it leads to an increased frequency of the to-be-suppressed thought in-
truding consciousness. It has also been claimed that suppression has disruptive effects on episodic
memory (i.e., a less paradoxical effect). The present article critically evaluates studies on the para-
doxical and less paradoxical effects of thought suppression. More specifically, the issue of whether
thought suppression plays a causative role in the development of various psychopathological
symptoms is addressed. While laboratory studies have come up with highly consistent findings
about the paradoxical effects of thought suppression, there is, as yet, little reason to believe that
such effects are implicated in the etiology of obsessions, phobias, or other psychopathological condi-
tions. Relatively little work has been done on the alleged memory effects of thought suppression.
The studies that have examined this issue have found mixed results. Accordingly, the case for the
amnestic power of thought suppression is weak. Alternative explanations and competing theories
are discussed, and it is concluded that research concerned with the psychopathological consequences
of thought suppression would benefit from development of better taxonomies of intrusive thinking
and cognitive avoidance strategies. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd.
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IN CLINICAL LITERATURE, the term “repression” may have various meanings. Yet,
in most cases, it refers to defensive maneuvers that expel unwanted thoughts from
conscious awareness. In a number of case studies, Sigmund Freud sought to docu-
ment the pathogenic effect of repression. The hysteria of Dora, the phobia of Little
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Hans, the obsession of the Ratman: All of these anecdotal testimonies were presented
by Freud as support for the notion that repression is the vehicle behind highly diverse
manifestations of psychopathology. Consider the example of the Ratman (S. Freud,
1955). This patient was plagued by the following obsession: He imagined punishing
his father by fastening a pan with rats to his father’s rectum. How is it possible that
someone suffers from such a bizarre intrusion? Freud came up with this explanation:
During his youth, the Ratman systematically repressed aggressive thoughts about his
father, but as he grew older the repressed material surfaced in the form of a patholog-
ical obsession. According to Freud, the Ratman is a prototypical example of the ante-
cedent role of repression in the development of psychopathology. Anna Freud further
elaborated this idea and claimed that “Repression is the most dangerous defence
mechanism (. . .) Repression is the basis for the formation of neurosis” (A. Freud,
1946, p. 44). She argued that repression is an unconscious, automatic process. By this
view, the person does not know that he/she tries to avoid certain thoughts (see, for an
extensive analysis, Erdelyi, 1993). 
To date, many research psychologists would argue that the Freudian view on repres-
sion is problematic. For example, Holmes (1990) summarized a large body of experi-
mental studies concerned with repression and concluded that “despite over sixty years
of research involving numerous approaches by many thoughtful and clever investiga-
tors, at the present time there is no controlled laboratory evidence supporting the
concept of repression” (p. 96). A similar conclusion was reached by Eysenck (1985),
who in his “Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire” carefully reviewed research on
repression and other Freudian concepts. Eysenck concluded that
 
what emerges again and again from examination of the empirical and experimental liter-
ature is that authors practically always fail to look at their studies and results from the
point of view of psychological theory, to see whether they could have been predicted as
well, or better, in terms well known to academic psychologists, rather than in Freudian
terms. (pp. 159–160)
 
Unlike automatic and unconscious repression, deliberate attempts to remove
thoughts from consciousness lend themselves much easier to experimental analysis.
Wegner (1989) termed this type of mental avoidance “thought suppression,” but the
phenomenon was already extensively described by William James (1890). James as-
sumed that an unwanted cognition can be avoided (suppressed) by shifting one’s at-
tention to another thought. He believed that in this way, people can regulate and con-
trol their stream of consciousness. Wegner is less optimistic about this possibility. He
maintains that the mental control that people can exert over their stream of con-
sciousness is limited. To illustrate this point, he asked undergraduates to suppress all
thoughts about a cup of coffee for a 30-second period. Whenever the students
thought about a cup of coffee, they had to ring a bell. The average frequency with
which students thought about the to-be-suppressed item was 3.7. Interestingly, when
undergraduates were instructed to concentrate on thinking about a cup of coffee for
30 seconds, their thoughts wandered away with an average frequency of 3.3 times.
These findings led Wegner (1989) to conclude that people are not able to control
their thoughts for periods longer than 10 seconds. He also noted that thought sup-
pression has a paradoxical effect in that it enhances the frequency with which the sup-
pressed thought surfaces in the stream of consciousness. This paradoxical effect
would suggest that suppression may have a pathogenic potential. In the words of Weg-
ner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987): “The observed processes, though fairly
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tame in the laboratory, might conceivably create powerful mental preoccupations in
natural settings” (p. 12).
This article reviews paradoxical and some less paradoxical effects of thought sup-
pression and critically evaluates the claim that they play an antecedent role in certain
manifestations of psychopathology. The article is structured as follows. First, experi-
mental studies concerned with the paradoxical consequences of thought suppression
are summarized. Next, the issue of thought suppression as a coping style or individual
difference factor is addressed. In addition, evidence for the link between thought sup-
pression and psychopathological phenomena is critically discussed. Then, potential
treatment implications of research on thought suppression are addressed. The article
closes with a brief discussion of fruitful research avenues for future studies.
 
THE PARADOXICAL EFFECTS
 
The Basic Phenomena
 
Systematic research on thought suppression only started after Wegner and colleagues
(1987) published their by now classic “white bear” experiments. The general outline
of their critical experiment was as follows. Normal subjects were assigned to one of
two groups. The first group was an “initial suppression” group in which subjects were
instructed to suppress the thought of a white bear for a 5-minute period. Following
this, subjects were given expression instructions: That is, they were asked to think
about a white bear during a 5-minute period. In the second group, termed the “initial
expression” group, the order of instructions was reversed. Here, subjects first engaged
in expression and then in suppression. Subjects had to ring a bell whenever they
thought of the target. Wegner and colleagues found that thought suppression pro-
duced an immediate enhancement effect. By and large, subjects who had received
suppression instructions were unable to completely suppress the target thought: The
mean frequency of white bear-thoughts during the suppression period was 6.8. Fur-
thermore, during expression, subjects were found to think more intensively about a
white bear (i.e., they rang the bell more frequently) when they had previously en-
gaged in thought suppression. Apparently, then, suppression of an unwanted thought
not only produces immediate enhancement, but also results in a higher frequency of
this thought later on. Wegner (1989) referred to the latter phenomenon as “the re-
bound effect of thought suppression.”
Thus, the pioneering work of Wegner (1989) showed that the paradoxical effects of
thought suppression can manifest itself in two forms: an immediate and/or a delayed
increase in the target thought. A number of subsequent studies have replicated both
phenomena. For example, using “vehicle” in stead of “white bear” as a target thought,
Lavy and Van den Hout (1990) reported an immediate enhancement effect similar to
that described by Wegner et al. (1987). As another example, Clark and colleagues
(Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991; Clark, Winton, & Thynn, 1993) found that suppression of
“green rabbit” thoughts produced a heightened level of intrusions about the perti-
nent item during a subsequent suppression-free period (i.e., a rebound effect).
Muris and Merckelbach (1991) collected data suggesting that the rebound effect of
thought suppression is maintained over longer time intervals. In their study, under-
graduates were asked to read a transcription of Freud’s Ratman case (cf. supra). Half
of the participants were then instructed to avoid all thoughts about this transcription
for a 10-minute period, while the other half were free to think about anything. After 1
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week, all participants were interviewed about how often they had had thoughts related
to the transcription over the past week. Participants who had engaged in suppression
reported more thoughts (4.6) about the Ratman transcription than did control sub-
jects (2.0). Paradoxical effects of thought suppression are not restricted to situations
in which people suppress personally irrelevant targets (e.g., white bears or other peo-
ple’s obsession). For example, Roemer and Borkovec (1994) noted that suppression
of personally relevant anxious or depressing themes leads to a subsequent enhance-
ment of these themes. Although not all researchers were able to replicate the immedi-
ate and/or delayed paradoxical effects following suppression (e.g., Kelly & Kahn,
1994; Muris, Merckelbach, Van den Hout, & De Jong, 1992; Smári, Sigurjónsdóttir, &
Sæmundsdóttir, 1994; Wegner, Quillian, & Houston, 1996), the bulk of the literature
suggests that these effects are quite robust.
One may argue that paradoxical effects of thought suppression are artifacts elicited
by, for example, instructions to ring a bell whenever the unwanted thought occurs.
However, paradoxical effects of thought suppression can also be documented when
subjects give 
 
aposterio
 
 estimates of the frequency of the to-be-suppressed material (e.g.,
Clark et al., 1991). In general, individuals seem to be very sensitive to frequency infor-
mation. For example, Brown (1990) had her subjects rate frequency of appearance of
actors in a TV soap and found that the correlation between subjective frequency esti-
mates and actual time on screen approached 0.91. Note further that paradoxical ef-
fects of thought suppression are not limited to self-reported frequencies, but may also
become apparent at a behavioral level. Germane to this issue is a study by Cioffi and
Holloway (1993) who noted that suppression of pain sensations has paradoxical ef-
fects on recovery from pain. These authors examined thought suppression effects in
subjects who underwent a cold pressor task. In this study, subjects were assigned to
one of three conditions: suppression, distraction, and monitoring (i.e., paying close
attention to physical sensations) and then had to carry out a cold pressor task. That is,
they were instructed to keep their hand in ice-water for as long as they could tolerate.
After this task, subjects had to rate levels of post-pressor pain on Visual Analogue
Scales (VAS’s). Results showed that suppression subjects had significantly higher VAS-
ratings, indicating that they recovered more slowly from pain than distraction and
monitoring subjects. Furthermore, in anticipation of a second cold pressor task, sub-
jects who had previously engaged in suppression, displayed a greater heart rate accel-
eration and lower self-efficacy to withstand the task than did subjects in the other con-
ditions.
As another example, Wegner, Shortt, Blake, and Page (1990) demonstrated that
suppression of an exciting thought, promotes physiological reactivity as indexed by
heightened skin conductance levels. Interestingly, behavioral consequences of
thought suppression have also been documented in social psychology literature. Mac-
rae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) conducted an experiment in which they
showed their participants a photograph of a male skinhead. Subjects were invited to
describe what a typical day of the person in the photo may look like. Half of the partic-
ipants were instructed to avoid stereotypic ideas about skinheads while engaging in
that task. The other half was given no such instructions. Following this, participants
were told that they would meet the skinhead. In anticipation of this meeting, they
were asked to take a seat. Subjects were free to choose between seven seats. The eighth
seat was evidently occupied by the skinhead, as a jacket and a bag were on it. Partici-
pants who had been instructed to avoid stereotypic ideas and control subjects were
compared to each other with respect to two dependent measures, namely, the fre-
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quency of stereotypes in the descriptions of a typical day of the skinhead and pre-
ferred seating position. While suppression subjects gave less stereotypes in their de-
scriptions than did controls, they preferred to sit further away from the skinhead’s
belongings than control subjects. Thus, these results suggest that suppression of ste-
reotypic thoughts does result in a paradoxical rebound effect at a behavioral level.
Taken together, these findings indicate that artifactual explanations of the paradoxi-
cal effects of suppression are themselves open to question.
 
Why Do Paradoxical Effects Occur?
 
Wegner (1989) speculated that when people try to avoid a certain thought, they often
do so by shifting their attention to an irrelevant environmental item. However, the tar-
get thought will come to mind during such distraction attempts and consequently, the
initially irrelevant item (the distracter) becomes associated with the target thought. In
this way, the irrelevant item is converted into a retrieval cue for the to-be-suppressed
information. Hence, the person will look for a new distracter. Iteration of this associa-
tive process results in a higher frequency of intrusions, simply because the person will
find himself surrounded by various stimuli that remind him of the to-be-suppressed
thought. Evidence for this so-called “environmental cueing” process comes from an
experiment in which the external distracters were manipulated (Wegner, Schneider,
Knutson, & McMahon, 1991; see also Muris, Merckelbach, & De Jong, 1993). While
engaging in suppression of white bear thoughts, subjects watched a series of slides.
Following suppression, they were instructed to think about a white bear. When this
was done in the context of the series of slides that were initially shown, a rebound ef-
fect occurred. Yet, when the context was changed, by showing a new series of slides,
no rebound was observed.
Recently, Wegner (1994) formulated a more elaborated version of the environmen-
tal cueing hypothesis. According to this more recent version, thought suppression ac-
tivates two opposing processes. The first one is a conscious and effort-demanding “op-
erating process” that searches continually for distracting stimuli. The second one is an
unconscious and relatively effortless “monitoring process” that is sensitive to occur-
rences of the unwanted thought. This monitoring process is triggered by attempts to
control the stream of consciousness and is maintained until such attempts are given
up. As the operating process is a conscious and capacity-limited process, it suffers
from concurrent operations that require cognitive effort. In contrast, the monitoring
process is relatively unaffected by other mental operations. This difference may lead
to an imbalance, in which the monitoring process overrules the operating process,
which in turn results in an increased detection of unwanted thoughts. Indirect sup-
port for Wegner’s theory comes from studies (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992) demon-
strating that thought suppression is less effective when subjects are involved in a con-
current task that also requires the operating process. For example, subjects who carry
out a word association task with time pressure, are less capable of suppressing a
thought than subjects who carry out a word association task without time pressure.
Emotions are also said to interfere with optimal functioning of the operating process.
By this view, anxious or depressed subjects would be less successful in suppressing un-
wanted thoughts (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). Interestingly, Bowers and
Woody (1996) found evidence to suggest that the paradoxical effects of thought sup-
pression fail to occur in hypnotized individuals, an observation that makes sense if
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one assumes that hypnosis promotes a state in which the intentional operating process
is bypassed.
 
Directed Forgetting
 
Remarkably, a completely different line of research referred to as “directed forget-
ting” indicates that when subjects receive a “forget” instruction, they 
 
can
 
 successfully
forget target stimuli (see, for an overview, Johnson, 1994). In directed forgetting ex-
periments, subjects are presented with two separate lists of words. One of these lists is
to be forgotten, while the other is to be memorized. After a short delay, subjects are
asked to recall all words, including those presented in the forget-list. In general, sub-
jects reproduce more items from the remember-list than from the forget-list. The di-
rected forgetting paradigm can be extended by varying the emotional valence of the
words. For example, both lists may contain positive (e.g., “merry”) and negative words
(e.g., “anxious”). Strikingly, the directed forgetting effect tends to be greater for neg-
ative than for positive words, especially in so-called repressors, that is, individuals who
are highly defensive and at the same time low-anxious (Myers, Brewin, & Power,
1998). These results seem to indicate that people can forget target stimuli, especially
negative target stimuli when they are instructed to do so. It is worth noting that studies
concerned with the rebound effect of thought suppression have often failed to find
such an interaction between avoidant strategies and target valence (e.g., Harvey &
Bryant, 1998a; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). In fact, the finding that thought suppres-
sion elicits paradoxical phenomena in negative, neutral, and positive target material
led Harvey and Bryant (1998a) to conclude that thought suppression may not be a
valid paradigm for clinical intrusions. Thus, in several respects, directed forgetting re-
search seems to contradict literature on thought suppression. It is important to stress,
though, that there are important technical differences between directed forgetting
and thought suppression paradigms. Most importantly, in directed forgetting experi-
ments, the forget-list is presented as a practice task that precedes the real memory
task. For example, Myers and colleagues (1998) instructed their subjects as follows:
“What you have done so far has been practice. You can forget about those words. I will
now show you the actual set of test words . . .” (p. 143). Yet, in a suppression experi-
ment, the instruction might have been more like: “I want you not to think about the
words I have just shown you.” These instructions communicate quite different actions.
In directed forgetting, subjects are allowed to ignore the targets, while they should
concentrate on words presented on a subsequent remember-list. Thus, subjects are
given a strong distracter for a target that has been trivialized. In contrast, in suppres-
sion studies, the target thought is made outstanding by the simple act of presenting it
as the to-be-suppressed target, while no distracter is provided. The consequence of
this is that subjects attend to a large array of environmental stimuli that become re-
trieval cues of the to-be-suppressed thought. Interestingly, Wegner and colleagues
(1987; exp. 2) noted in a follow-up experiment that a rebound effect of suppression
does not occur when subjects are given instructions to focus on one single, outstand-
ing distracter (e.g., red Volkswagen) whenever the to-be-suppressed thought comes to
mind. This suggests that distracters may, indeed, play a vital role in whether or not
suppression produces a preoccupation with the target material.
The technical differences between directed forgetting and thought suppression
paradigms may explain the conflicting results that these two research lines have gen-
erated. Meanwhile, the question arises which paradigm is more ecologically valid as a
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model for real life obsessive intrusions. It is intuitively plausible to argue that thought
suppression has more everyday equivalents than does directed forgetting. Even so, the
precise differences between both paradigms warrant further study. So far, research on
thought suppression has largely ignored the phenomenon of directed forgetting.
 
THOUGHT SUPPRESSION AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
 
Individual Differences in Thought Suppression Tendencies
 
Results obtained by Merckelbach, Muris, Van den Hout, and De Jong (1991) indicate
that people differ in how successful they are at thought suppressing. These authors
found a positive relationship (
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .59, 
 
n
 
 
 
5
 
 35, 
 
p
 
 
 
,
 
 .001) between the number of intru-
sions during suppression and the frequency of intrusions during control periods (see
also Rutledge, Hollenberg, & Hancock, 1993). That is, subjects who reported a high
frequency of intrusions when they tried to suppress a certain thought, also displayed a
stronger rebound effect during subsequent suppression-free periods. This suggests
that an individual difference factor is at work in the paradoxical effects of thought
suppression. 
To measure individual differences in the motivation to suppress unwanted thoughts
across a wide range of situations, Wegner and Zanakos (1994) developed a 15-item
questionnaire that they termed the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI). Typi-
cal examples of WBSI-items are: “I wish I could stop thinking of certain things” and “I
have thoughts that I cannot stop.” WBSI-items are scored on 5-point scales (anchors:
1 
 
5
 
 
 
strongly disagree
 
; 5 
 
5
 
 
 
strongly agree
 
). A total score is calculated by summing across
the items. Accordingly, a high WBSI-score would indicate a strong tendency to sup-
press unwanted thoughts. Wegner and Zanakos, as well as Muris, Merckelbach, and
Horselenberg (1996), found that the psychometric qualities of the WBSI are satisfac-
tory. To illustrate, in the Muris et al. study, internal consistency of the WBSI was good
(Cronbach’s 
 
a
 
 
 
5
 
 .89; 
 
n
 
 
 
5
 
 172) and test-retest stability (12-week interval) proved to be
adequate (
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .80; 
 
n
 
 
 
5
 
 40; 
 
p
 
 
 
,
 
 .001). That study also found that subjects with high
WBSI-scores subsequently report more intrusions in an experimental thought sup-
pression set-up than subjects with low WBSI-scores, suggesting that the WBSI possesses
predictive validity. Taken together, it is safe to assume that the WBSI is sensitive to in-
dividual differences in the extent to which people rely on thought suppression as a
general mental control strategy. As people who try to suppress unwanted thoughts
are, in fact, very poor at it, Wegner and Zanakos (1994) reasoned that a chronic and
generalized tendency to suppress thoughts may serve as a risk factor for psychopatho-
logical conditions. In their words, “chronic thought suppression should cause symp-
toms of obsession, depression, and anxiety” (p. 619). We now turn to studies that
sought to explore the psychopathological ramifications of thought suppression.
 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
 
There are reasons to believe that the paradoxical effects of thought suppression are
not restricted to the laboratory. According to Wegner (1989), suppression may con-
tribute to the obsessive nature of an initially relatively harmless (nontraumatic)
thought: “An obsession can grow from nothing but the desire to suppress a thought”
(p. 167). Thus, Wegner claims that the vicious circle of suppression, rebound, and
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again (more) suppression, and (more) rebound may be sufficient to transform a neu-
tral thought into an obsessive intrusion. 
Indirect support for the idea that thought suppression plays a role in the develop-
ment of pathological obsessions comes from various sources. To begin with, Muris et
al. (1996) found in a nonclinical sample a significant correlation (
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .35, 
 
p
 
 
 
,
 
 .001)
between WBSI-scores and scores on the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory
(MOCI). A similar correlation was reported by Wegner and Zanakos (1994). Follow-
ing a different research strategy, Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) found evidence to sug-
gest that suppression contributes to the development of obsessions. These authors
asked healthy volunteers to identify a recent negative intrusive thought. Next, subjects
were assigned to one of three conditions: a suppression group, an expression group
(in which subjects were instructed to think explicitly about the identified thought
whenever it occurred), and a no-instruction group. Subjects were told to record for a
4-day period the number of times the pertinent thought intruded their consciousness
as well as the degree of discomfort whenever this happened. Thereto, they were given
a postcard on which they were instructed to put a tick every time the thought came to
mind. Suppression subjects reported more intrusions and greater discomfort than
control subjects. This suggests that suppression not only leads to a heightened fre-
quency of intrusions, but may also change the emotional evaluation of the intrusion.
Smári, Birgisdóttir, and Brynjólfsdóttir (1995) found, in a nonclinical sample, that
high scores on the MOCI predict a relatively strong paradoxical effect of suppression
instructions. In subjects scoring low on the MOCI, such an effect was absent. Further
evidence for the link between suppression and obsession is of a more inferential na-
ture and can be found in, for example, the often cited Rachman and De Silva (1978)
study on normal and abnormal obsessions. One of the main conclusions of that study
was that obsessive intrusions in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients and
normals have a highly similar content, yet, do differ in terms of frequency, intensity,
discomfort, and, most pertinent to the present discussion, resistance (or if one likes:
suppression). The fact that the content of intrusive thinking does not differentiate be-
tween normal and clinical obsessions points in the direction of a continuum between
both categories of obsessions. Aspects like the urge to resist obsessions rather than
their content would characterize the clinical range of this continuum (see also Rach-
man, 1997). The pioneering work of Rachman and De Silva was replicated by Sal-
kovskis and Harrison (1984). These authors also noted a close link between resistance
and frequency of obsessive intrusions.
Recent studies suggest that thought suppression may also be involved in compulsive
behaviors. For example, Muris, Merckelbach, and Clavan (1997) compared rituals of
normal subjects with those of OCD patients. As is true for obsessive intrusions, normal
and abnormal compulsions were found to be highly similar in content. Yet, the two
categories of rituals did differ in terms of frequency, intensity, discomfort, and, again,
resistance. A study by Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, and Stapert (1999) further investi-
gated the relationship between thought suppression and ritualistic behaviors in nor-
mal subjects. More specifically, these authors examined rituals of subjects with high
and low WBSI-scores. As expected, high WBSI-subjects experienced their rituals as
more intense, more discomforting, and more resistance-provoking than low WBSI-
subjects. These findings are consistent with the notion that thought suppression plays
a role in the development of pathological compulsion.
The question arises whether thought suppression and its paradoxical effects really
act as antecedents in the etiology of pathological intrusions and rituals. Although the
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research discussed above strongly suggests such a causal link, there are more articu-
lated accounts of the development of OCD symptoms. For example, some authors
(Rachman, 1993, 1997, 1998; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) have pointed
out that a certain type of cognitive bias known as thought-action fusion (TAF) rather
than suppression per se underlies the etiology of pathological obsessions. Briefly, TAF
refers to an overvaluation of intrusive thoughts, such that unwanted thoughts are ap-
praised as equivalents of unwanted action. An example would be the belief that unac-
ceptable thoughts are as bad as the actual actions they describe. It is easy to see how
TAF could contribute to an inflated sense of responsibility and, subsequently, to sup-
pression and neutralization attempts. Thus, according to this analysis, the primary an-
tecedent of obsessive intrusions would be TAF, while suppression can be conceptual-
ized as a secondary and possibly counterproductive reaction to TAF-intrusions. A
recent laboratory study by Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, and Spaan (1999) explored
the effects of experimentally induced TAF. In this experiment, adolescent subjects un-
derwent a bogus EEG-recording session. Subjects in the experimental group were in-
formed that the apparatus was able to pick up the word “apple” and that thinking of
that word could result in the administration of electrical shocks to a person in an adja-
cent room. Subjects in the control group were told that the EEG-equipment was sensi-
tive to “read” simple words such as “apple” and were asked to sit quietly and relax. Af-
ter having spent 15 minutes in the EEG-laboratory, experimental and control subjects
completed a short questionnaire containing items about characteristics (e.g., fre-
quency, aversiveness) of the target thought. Results showed that subjects in the exper-
imental group reported a higher frequency of target thoughts, more discomfort, and
a greater urge to suppress compared to subjects in the control group. These findings
are consistent with the idea that TAF promotes intrusive thinking and that it precedes
suppression attempts. Such an interpretation is further supported by a recent study of
Rassin, Muris, Schmidt, & Merckelbach (in press). In that study, 173 students com-
pleted the TAF-scale (Shafran et al., 1996), WBSI, and MOCI. Structural equation
modeling was used to explore the best fitting causal relationships between the scores
on these scales. Results suggested that a TAF bias triggers suppression tendencies,
while these tendencies increase obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Thus, again, the in-
terpretation of intrusions (i.e., the TAF bias) seems to be a more fundamental cause
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms than the tendency to suppress intrusions. Given
these preliminary results, there is a clear need for future studies in which TAF and
suppression are manipulated simultaneously. Such parametric studies could shed fur-
ther light on the precise dynamics between these factors.
 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Phobia, and Depression
 
Becker, Rinck, Roth, and Margraf (1998) examined effects of suppression in patients
with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and normal controls. While GAD patients
and controls did not differ in their ability to suppress neutral material (e.g., white
bears), GAD patients found it harder to suppress thoughts about their recent worries.
More specifically, GAD patients displayed an immediate enhancement effect when
they tried to suppress their main worry, whereas controls did not show such an effect.
The authors take this as evidence to conclude that “patients with GAD do indeed suf-
fer from a lack of mental control regarding their worries” (Becker et al., 1998, p. 51).
But, of course, these findings do not show that thought suppression is the vehicle be-
hind worries in GAD. Indeed, in literature a radically different perspective on GAD
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(e.g., Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998) can be found, a perspective
which conceptualizes worrying as a cognitive reaction to intolerance of uncertainty.
By this view, worrying is an act of avoidance of fear provoking imagery that develops as
a consequence of ambiguous “what if” problems. Evidence to support this line of rea-
soning comes from the work of Borkovec and co-workers (e.g., Borkovec & Inz, 1990)
who demonstrated that worrying has an inhibitory effect on physiological reactivity to
phobic imagery. This suggests that rather than being preceded by mental avoidance
maneuvers such as suppression worrying 
 
is
 
 an act of mental avoidance.
Muris, De Jongh, Merckelbach, Postema, and Vet (1998) examined the role of
thought suppression in dental phobia. Nonphobic and phobic patients were instructed
to suppress or to express (i.e., think about) negative dentist-related thoughts while un-
dergoing dental treatment. As expected, phobic patients exhibited higher levels of sup-
pression and intrusive thinking than nonphobic patients. However, only in the nonpho-
bic group, suppression instructions produced a significant enhancement in intrusive
thinking and anxiety. The counterproductive effects of thought suppression did not oc-
cur in the phobic group. Comparable results were reported for another type of specific
phobia, namely spider phobia (see Muris, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, Sijsenaar, &
Leeuw, 1997). Thus, as things stand, there is no ground for suspecting that thought sup-
pression plays an important role in the etiology of phobias.
As to the link between suppression and depression, Kuyken and Brewin (1994)
found in their cross-sectional study of depressed women that those women with partic-
ular high levels of intrusion and avoidance were also more severely depressed. Yet, as
these authors themselves admit, the direction of causality awaits further study. Wen-
zlaff et al. (1988) noted that depressed individuals exhibit a deficit in the ability to
suppress unwanted, negative thoughts. More specifically, their results show that the ef-
ficacy of depressed subjects’ suppression efforts is short-lived in that suppression at-
tempts are accompanied by a resurgence of unwanted thoughts about the negative
item (see, for similar findings, Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991). Perhaps,
then, depression undermines mental control over negative thoughts, thereby
strengthening the paradoxical effects of thought suppression. But, note that in this
analysis, suppression is a by-product rather than a determinant of depressive mood.
This interpretation nicely fits with Rachman’s (1981) view that dysphoria contributes
to the persistence of intrusions by impairing mental control over these intrusions.
Note that there is suggestive evidence for Rachman’s position (e.g., Clark, 1992).
 
Addiction
 
A number of studies have explored whether suppression promotes smoke-related intru-
sions in ex-smokers. In an experiment by Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994), 62 ex-smokers
were assigned to one of three groups: a suppression group (in which subjects were in-
structed to suppress thoughts about smoking), an expression group (in which subjects
just had to record thoughts about smoking), or a relaxation group (in which subjects
carried out breathing exercises that distracted them from smoking-related thoughts).
Results demonstrated that all subjects frequently experienced intrusive thoughts about
smoking and that they had difficulty in controlling such thoughts. Yet, subjects in the
suppression group exhibited an increased frequency of intrusions compared to the
other two groups. In a related study, Haaga and Allison (1994) retrospectively examined
the connection between coping style and smoking relapse. The authors found that the
strategies employed by ex-smokers to maintain abstinence in case of strong urges to
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smoke can be reduced to two broad coping styles: cognitive restructuring (e.g., thinking
about negative health consequences) and thought suppression. Subjects were inter-
viewed on two occasions: 3 to 12 months after they had given up smoking. On both oc-
casions, subjects who successfully stopped smoking more often employed the strategy of
cognitive restructuring, compared to subjects who relapsed. This suggests that cognitive
restructuring is a good predictor of successful smoking cessation, but it does not neces-
sarily imply that thought suppression is involved in relapse. 
Stronger evidence for the detrimental effects of thought suppression comes from
Palfai, Monti, Colby, and Rohsenow (1997), who examined the role of suppression in
heavy social drinkers. A group of heavy social drinkers was exposed to the sight and
smell of their usual alcohol beverage. During this exposure, half of the subjects were
instructed to suppress their urge to drink alcohol, while the other half did not receive
these instructions. Following this, subjects carried out a cue reactivity task in which
they were asked to make judgments about a series of alcohol outcome expectancies.
Results showed that subjects in the suppression condition were faster to endorse alco-
hol outcome expectancies following exposure to alcohol cues than subjects in the
control condition. Thus, suppression seemed to increase the accessibility of alcohol
related information.
 
Trauma-related Psychopathology
 
While avoidance and intrusions are hallmark features of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD),
there has been only one study investigating the effects of thought suppression in this
condition. In that study, Harvey and Bryant (1998b) examined survivors of motor ve-
hicle accidents with and without ASD. Subjects monitored their trauma-related
thoughts for three 5-minute periods. During period 1 (i.e., baseline), subjects were al-
lowed to think about anything. During period 2, subjects were given either suppres-
sion or nonsuppression instructions in relation to thoughts of the trauma. In period 3,
subjects were, again, instructed to think about anything. Results showed that ASD sub-
jects reported higher levels of anxiety, trauma-related thoughts, and suppression than
non-ASD subjects. Most interestingly, ASD subjects who were given suppression in-
structions, demonstrated a rebound effect, that is, an increased frequency of trauma-
related intrusions in the period subsequent to suppression.
Like ASD, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is characterized by intrusive
thoughts about the traumatic incident and efforts to avoid such thoughts (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). Amir et al. (1997) found that PTSD patients
(
 
N
 
 
 
5
 
 46) reported thought suppression to be the most frequent cognitive reaction to
traumatic intrusions. In this regard, the PTSD patients differed from non-PTSD anxi-
ety disorder patients and healthy controls. Apparently, then, ASD and PTSD patients
try to rely on thought suppression to avoid recollections of their traumatic experi-
ence. As with obsession, one may speculate that such avoidance maneuvers will gener-
ate more thoughts about the trauma (i.e., the paradoxical effect; see McFarlane,
1988). Evidence that adds weight to this view comes from a study by Lawrence, Fauer-
bach, and Munster (1996), who interviewed 23 burn patients on the day of their dis-
charge from the hospital and at a 4 months follow-up. On both occasions, patients
completed the Impact of Event Scale, a self-report scale measuring cognitive avoid-
ance (i.e., suppression) and intrusive thinking. Avoidance at the time of discharge sig-
nificantly predicted the occurrence of intrusions 4 months later (
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .59, 
 
p
 
 
 
,
 
 .01).
Similarly, Bryant and Harvey (1995) found in their sample of 56 motor vehicle acci-
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dent victims that avoidance was significantly associated with intrusive thinking 1 year
after the accident (
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .56, 
 
p
 
 
 
,
 
 .01). As another example, Shipherd and Beck (1999)
invited 36 women who were victims of sexual assault to participate in a suppression ex-
periment. Seventeen of these women suffered from PTSD, while the remaining 19 did
not completely fulfill DSM-IV criteria for PTSD, although they did suffer from subclin-
ical PTSD symptoms. All women underwent three 9-minute periods, the first of which
was spent thinking of anything. During the second period, women were instructed to
suppress thoughts about the sexual assault. During the last period, women were told
that they could think of anything including the assault. Results indicated that subjects
in both groups were equally successful in suppressing trauma related thoughts. How-
ever, PTSD patients suffered from a rebound of intrusive thoughts during the third
period, while controls did not display such a rebound effect.
While the studies summarized thus far seem to imply that in PTSD, suppression pre-
cedes intrusion, there are also longitudinal studies that found evidence for the oppo-
site pattern. For example, Creamer, Burgess, and Pattison (1992) found that in 158
witnesses to a multiple shooting, avoidance predicted stress at 4 months, but not at 14
months after the trauma. On the basis of this observation, these authors noted that
“intrusion precedes escape and avoidance, with the latter conceptualized as coping
strategies, albeit often maladaptive, in response to discomfort that results from intru-
sive memories” (Creamer et al., 1992, p. 454). In a similar vein, Cella, Perry, Kulchy-
cky, and Goodwin (1988) interviewed close relatives of hospital burn patients on three
occasions: during the acute phase of hospitalization, at a 7-week follow-up, and a
7-month follow-up. The data collected through these interviews led the authors to
conclude that intrusive symptoms receded more rapidly than avoidant coping strate-
gies. Note that these findings are consistent with the work of Foa, Riggs, and Gershuny
(1995) on the structure of PTSD symptoms. Their work suggests that intrusions give
rise to active avoidance rather than the other way around. These authors also con-
cluded that many victims who do not meet the full criteria for PTSD report thought
suppression and intrusions. It is the passive avoidance implicated in symptoms of
numbing that differentiates victims with and without PTSD. Clearly, these findings
cast doubt on the idea that thought suppression acts as an important antecedent in
the radicalization of PTSD symptoms.
 
Conclusion
 
The studies reviewed in this section demonstrate that thought suppression maneuvers
do figure in a wide variety of mental problems and disorders. Even so, the case for a
pathogenic role of thought suppression in these disorders is weak. While the paradox-
ical effects of thought suppression were originally invoked to account for obsessive in-
trusions, a more recent and more sophisticated explanation emphasizes the anteced-
ent role of thought-action fusion, rather than thought suppression per se, in the
development of obsessions. Likewise, in the case of worrying, there is an alternative
conceptualization that stresses intolerance of uncertainty as a precursor of worrying.
Clearly, thought suppression does occur as an accompanying feature in phobias and
depressive mood, but there is no reason to suspect that it has a causative status in
these disorders. This might also be true for ASD and PTSD in which the temporal dy-
namics suggest that intrusions may fuel thought suppression rather than vice versa.
The most robust evidence for the involvement of thought suppression in the radical-
ization of symptoms comes from research on addiction and cue reactivity. Here, there
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are some indications that thought suppression may enhance cue reactivity and, conse-
quently, may contribute to relapse. However, the preliminary character of the work in
this domain precludes firm conclusions about the robustness of the link between
thought suppression and relapse.
 
THOUGHT SUPPRESSION AND MEMORY
 
It is widely believed that adults who have experienced traumatic childhood events may
cope with these experiences by engaging in selective suppression of traumatic memo-
ries (e.g., Brett & Ostroff, 1985; Terr, 1991, 1993). By this view, selective “forgetting”
or thought suppressing would underlie psychogenic, or in DSM-IV terms dissociative,
amnesia, that is, “an inability to recall important personal information, usually of a
traumatic or stressful nature, that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forget-
fulness” (APA, 1994, p. 477). There are at least two reasons why this view is problem-
atic. To begin with, it remains to be seen whether neurologically intact individuals can
develop amnesia for traumatic events. For example, on the basis of an extensive re-
view of retrospective and prospective studies, Pope, Hudson, Bodkin, and Oliva
(1998) concluded that the phenomenon of dissociative amnesia itself remains un-
proven. These authors point out that the main problem of studies with dissociative
amnesia is that they equate nonreporting of trauma with dissociative amnesia, thereby
ignoring the possibility that such nonreporting results from people’s reluctance to dis-
close sensitive autobiographical material (see also Lilienfeld & Loftus, 1998). Second,
even if it is taken for granted that dissociative amnesia exists, it is doubtful whether
thought suppression would be the critical mechanism involved. Of particular rele-
vance to this issue is Wegner and Erber’s (1992) observation that suppression of target
thoughts leads to hyperaccessibility of these thoughts. In their experiments, Wegner
and Erber demonstrated that especially under conditions of high mental load, sup-
pression of certain targets makes these targets extremely well retrievable during, for
example, word-association or Stroop color tasks. Findings such as these are difficult to
reconcile with the idea that “the deliberate act of setting a memory aside leads easily
to its permanent removal from consciousness” (Terr, 1991, p. 15). Much the same is
true for the finding that women with parental abuse histories display an enhanced di-
rected remembering rather than an enhanced directed forgetting of targets (e.g.,
negative words; Cloitre, Cancienne, Brodsky, Dulit, & Perry, 1996; see also McNally,
Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, & Pitman, 1998). 
While total dissociative amnesia is an unlikely scenario in traumatized people, in-
complete recollections of traumas do occur. Germane to this issue is a study by Koss,
Figueredo, Bell, Tharan, and Tromp (1996) who found that traumatic memories of
rape victims are less clear and vivid, less detailed, and less likely to occur in the origi-
nal order compared to memories of pleasant events. Although these characteristics
can be attributed to an attentional narrowing effect during encoding (Wessel, 1997),
Koss et al. argue that they might also originate from an avoidant coping style (e.g.,
thought suppression). In contrast to what one may expect on the basis of experimen-
tal thought suppression research, yet in line with the findings of Koss et al. (1996), re-
cent studies have claimed that thought suppression may have memory undermining
effects (Wegner et al., 1996). In the critical experiment, Wegner and colleagues
(1996) exposed subjects to a film fragment and then assigned them to one of three
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conditions: a suppression condition (in which subjects had to suppress thoughts
about the film), an expression condition (in which subjects were encouraged to think
about the film), and a no-instruction control condition. Five hours later, subjects’
memories about the film were tested. Results showed that whilst subjects in all three
conditions scored equally on questions about the content of the fragment, suppres-
sion subjects performed significantly worse on questions addressing the chronology of
events in the film fragment. Suppression also affected meta-memory representations
of the film in that suppression subjects thought more of the film as a collection of iso-
lated pictures (i.e., snapshots) compared to subjects in the expression and control
conditions. While the observed effect was small and was restricted to memory for se-
quence of the film fragment, these results suggest that suppression may undermine
episodic memory. Accordingly, Wegner et al. (1996) contend that the memory-out-of-
order effects of thought suppression might in extreme cases lead to partial (psy-
chogenic) amnesia. In their words: “The snapshot effect of suppression suggests that
people might indeed do something that resembles the effect attributed to classical re-
pression (. . .) it does yield a new way to think about how traumatic events might con-
ceivably be lost to memory” (Wegner et al., 1996, p. 689). Apart from the experimen-
tal evidence provided by the Wegner et al. study, there is some indirect evidence for
the memory undermining effects of thought suppression. In two subsequent studies
(Muris & Merckelbach, 1997; Van den Hout, Merckelbach, & Pool, 1996), a positive
and significant correlation between the WBSI and the Dissociative Experiences Scale
(DES) was found (
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .52 and 
 
r
 
 
 
5
 
 .35, respectively). Frankel (1990) has argued that a
number of DES items “can be readily explained by the manner in which subjects re-
call memories” (p. 827). Thus, it may well be the case that the DES taps memory prob-
lems that occur in those subjects who have a strong tendency to suppress.
The less paradoxical, that is, memory undermining effect of thought suppression
seems to run counter to the hyperaccessibility that characterizes the paradoxical ef-
fects of thought suppression. Note, however, that there are important differences in
the experimental set-up of studies concerned with memory effects of thought suppres-
sion and those concerned with hyperaccessibility effects. Whereas studies on the para-
doxical effects of thought suppression focus on how thought suppression affects the
frequency of relatively simple target thoughts, research on memory effects of thought
suppression employs more complex stimuli such as film scenes. Nevertheless, Wegner
and colleagues (1996) suggest several ways in which the paradoxical and memory dis-
turbing effects of thought suppression might co-exist. For example, these authors
speculate that suppression promotes the hyperaccessibility of highly specific film
scenes. The hyperaccessible scenes then become outstanding memory details that
overshadow sequence information. While such an interpretation reconciles the hyper-
accessibility and memory disturbing effects of thought suppression, several critical
points can be raised. First, in the Wegner et al. (1996) study, suppression subjects did
not report an increased frequency of film related thoughts. Thus, hyperaccessibility
does not seem to be a 
 
conditio sine qua non
 
 for “memories out of order.” Second,
Rassin, Merckelbach, and Muris (1997) failed to replicate the memory-out-of order ef-
fect of suppression, although they did find a hyperaccessibility effect. The film frag-
ment used by Rassin and colleagues differed in two important ways from the type of
film scenes in Wegner et al. studies. First, it was of shorter duration (3 minutes vs. 10
minutes in the Wegner et al. studies). Second, the fragment employed by Rassin et al.
had an emotional content, whereas the Wegner et al. (1996) fragments were “interest-
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ing, but nontraumatic” (p. 682). The fact that thought suppression fails to produce a
deficient memory of chronology when emotional material is involved, casts doubts on
the speculation that thought suppression plays a role in partial amnesia.
In sum, then, while there is some circumstantial evidence to suggest that thought
suppression has a negative effect on episodic memory, the precise details of this con-
nection are not well-understood. Further studies are needed to define the robustness,
limits, and variations of the memory-out-of-order effect of thought suppression.
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THERAPY
 
Wegner (1989) is clear about the lessons for treatment to be learned from thought
suppression studies: “in many cases of unwanted thought, it may be best to stop sup-
pressing” (p. 174). According to Wegner, thought suppression experiments provide a
straightforward rationale for habituation- or exposure-oriented treatments. In clinical
literature, some good examples can be found that seem to underline Wegner’s posi-
tion. Thought stopping is a case in point. In thought stopping treatment, the patient
is instructed to circumvent an obsessive intrusion by saying “stop” whenever it occurs.
The efficacy of this intervention is, at best, modest (Marks, 1987), which is not surpris-
ing given the close parallels between thought suppression and thought stopping. Sys-
tematic exposure to obsessive intrusions appears to be a more promising treatment
strategy. To illustrate, Salkovskis and Westbrook (1989) tape-recorded obsessive
thoughts of their patients and then instructed these patients to listen to the tapes for
several days at selected times. Patients were also taught how to refrain from covert
avoidance tendencies (e.g., thought suppression). The combination of exposure and
response prevention led to a decrease in obsessive thoughts and this positive outcome
was maintained at long-term follow-up. 
Taped habituation and prevention of thought suppression tendencies may also be
fruitfully applied to other types of psychopathology. For example, Vaughan and Tar-
rier (1992) asked PTSD patients to describe their traumatic experiences and these de-
scriptions were then audiotaped. Patients were instructed to listen to the audiotaped
traumas for 1 hour per day over a 1-week period. They were also taught not to react
with thought suppression to these tapes. Most of the patients benefited from treat-
ment and this positive effect was maintained at 6 months follow-up. Likewise, Rey-
nolds and Tarrier (1996) instructed PTSD patients to monitor their traumatic intru-
sions by keeping a detailed diary over a 2-month period. This resulted in an overall
improvement such that at the end of the study, four out of six patients no longer met
PTSD-criteria. Thus, confrontation with and elaboration of unwanted, negative
thoughts seem to be effective elements in the treatment of PTSD. This is further illus-
trated by studies in which individuals had to write about personally upsetting events
over and over again (e.g., Pennebaker, 1993; see also Esterling, L’Abate, Murray, &
Pennebaker, 1999). In general, positive outcomes in terms of physical and mental
health have been reported in studies that relied on this diary method.
The studies cited above accord well with Wegner’s (1989) suggestion that confront-
ing an unwanted thought is a good starting point for treatment. However, this conclu-
sion needs to be qualified. To begin with, it remains to be determined to what extent
abstinence from thought suppression is a mediator of therapeutic success in the treat-
ment of obsessive or traumatic intrusions. For example, in a recent study, Petrie,
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Booth, and Pennebaker (1998) compared the effects of expressive writing and
thought suppression. These authors assigned the participants in their study to either
of four conditions. More specifically, one group of subjects was invited to write for 15
minutes about a personal and emotional topic after which they were instructed to sup-
press thoughts about what they had written. A second group wrote about an emo-
tional topic, but received no suppression instructions afterwards. In the third and
fourth condition, subjects wrote about a nonpersonal and neutral topic, with and
without subsequent suppression instructions, respectively. Immunological markers
served as dependent measures (e.g., the number of lymphocytes found in the sub-
jects’ blood). Results indicated that there was only a marginal suppression effect (
 
p
 
 
 
5
 
.08), but a significant main effect for writing content (
 
p
 
 
 
5
 
 .03), in that irrespective of
suppression attempts, writing about self-relevant topics produced better health effects
than writing about neutral topics. Thus, these results seem to indicate that expressive
writing may overrule the detrimental effects of suppression. Likewise, in the Reynolds
and Tarrier (1996) study, it was found that monitoring of traumatic intrusions had
beneficial effects, even when it was accompanied by avoidant control strategies (e.g.,
thought suppression). The authors suggested that keeping a diary of intrusive recol-
lections increases the amount of patients’ perceived control over their thoughts. Per-
haps, then, it is an increased sense of being in control rather than abstinence from
thought suppression that constitutes the therapeutically active element in the studies
referred to above. This may also explain why contrary to the predictions that flow
from Wegner’s work, some studies did find positive effects of thought stopping in the
treatment of obsession (e.g., Kirk, 1983). However, in those studies, patients were first
taught how to deliberately evoke obsessive thoughts. Only after they had mastered
this, they were instructed to direct thought stopping techniques to any neutralizing at-
tempts that might occur as a reaction to the obsessions. Again, the crucial element
might be a sense of control over traumatic intrusions.
Secondly, while it has become common wisdom that confronting and expressing
painful thoughts and emotions is therapeutically effective, there are several research
findings that invite a more balanced view on this issue. For example, dysphoric indi-
viduals who are instructed to ruminate about themselves and their feelings have been
found to be more pessimistic and impaired in their problem solving capabilities than
are dysphoric individuals who distract their attention from their moods (see, for a re-
view, Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). As another example, there
are indications that unstructured exposure to trauma reminders might be harmful in
the treatment of PTSD (e.g., Boudewyns & Hyer, 1990; Johnson et al., 1996). On a re-
lated note, Solomon et al. (1992) found that treating PTSD veterans with prolonged
exposure to military cues may result in exacerbation of PTSD symptoms. Commenting
on these disappointing findings, Littrell (1998) concluded that confronting painful
memories and thoughts will only yield benefit if the treatment also encourages cogni-
tive restructuring of the traumatic experiences. It is worth citing the final remarks of
Littrell’s (1998) thoughtful review:
 
Revisiting painful emotion has the potential to improve health and psychological function-
ing. However, success is not explained by a purging/discharge mechanism or because the
opposite of attending to emotion, viz., inhibition is precluded. Mere attention to feelings of
distress can enhance distress. In order to preclude increasing distress as a consequence of
revisiting trauma, some new response to the negative-emotion-eliciting stimulus (. .) must
be found. (p. 96)
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
 
The pioneering work of Wegner and colleagues (1987) on the paradoxical effects of
thought suppression has stimulated a vast amount of research (see, for a review, Clark
& Purdon, 1993). To date, more than 30 studies have documented immediate en-
hancement and/or rebound effects of thought suppression. Thus, it is safe to con-
clude that the paradoxical consequences of thought suppression represent robust
phenomena. In contrast, the memory-out-of-order effect that is also ascribed to
thought suppression (Wegner et al., 1996), is less well established. That is, a recent at-
tempt to replicate this phenomenon with emotional target material yielded disap-
pointing results (Rassin et al., 1997). Thus, parametric studies are needed to establish
the boundary conditions of the memory-out-of-order effect of thought suppression
(see below).
In literature, speculations about the involvement of thought suppression in psycho-
pathology abound. These speculations often boil down to the idea that thought sup-
pression contributes to the etiology or maintenance of obsessions, anxiety symptoms,
depressive moods, or addictions. This idea possesses face validity given the robustness
of the paradoxical effects of thought suppression in the laboratory. It is worth citing
again Wegner et al.’s (1987) words: “The observed processes, though fairly tame in
the laboratory, might conceivably create powerful mental preoccupations in natural
settings” (p. 12). However, thought suppression studies that have been carried out in
clinical samples do not support such a line of reasoning. Over the past few years, other
theories about the origins of obsessions (e.g., Rachman, 1998) and worrying (Dugas et
al., 1998) have been formulated and tested with favorable results. In these well-articu-
lated accounts, thought suppression plays a relatively marginal role. Likewise, in the
case of phobias and traumatic intrusions it is not at all clear whether thought suppres-
sion represents more than a symptomatic epiphenomenon. This is not to say that
thought suppression maneuvers in these disorders should be ignored, but rather that
their causal significance might have been overstated.
The links between thought suppression, cognitive intrusions, and psychopathology
warrant further study. For example, few studies have examined Rachman’s (1981)
proposal that depressive mood impairs the controllability of intrusive cognitions,
while anxiety enhances the threatening nature of such cognitions. Meanwhile, further
progress in this area will critically depend on two issues that both have to do with the
taxonomy of the basic phenomena involved. First, previous studies on thought sup-
pression have generally adopted a broad definition of intrusive thinking. Worries, in-
trusive traumatic memories, anxious thoughts, and intrusive thoughts all have been
treated as similar phenomena that may or may not become targets of thought suppres-
sion. While these manifestations of intrusive cognition share a number of features
(e.g., Tallis & De Silva, 1992), they also differ in important respects. Germane to this
issue is the work of Clark (1992; Clark & Claybourn, 1997) who found that one can
distinguish between obsessive intrusions and negative automatic thoughts, with the
former being more ego-dystonic and unacceptable than the latter. Likewise, worries
and obsessive intrusions differ in that worries have a more verbal character, are more
oriented towards future threats, and are less involuntary (e.g., Wells & Morrison,
1994; Clark & Claybourn, 1997). Additionally, recent work of Brewin and colleagues
(Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998) shows that
there are important differences between intrusive thoughts and intrusive memories,
with the former occurring more often in PTSD patients, depressive patients, and even
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normal subjects. Also, intrusive thought often contains elements such as reinterpreta-
tion or catastrophic elaboration. What is urgently needed, then, is a more accurate
taxonomy of cognitive intrusions and the dimensions on which they vary. Such a tax-
onomy would enable researchers and clinicians to formulate more sophisticated hy-
potheses about the dynamics behind cognitive intrusions and the role played by
thought suppression in these dynamics.
Secondly, it has become customary to think of thought suppression as a unitary phe-
nomenon (Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1991). At the same time,
there is a large, but scattered literature on the various avoidance and escape oriented
strategies that people may resort to when they are confronted with intrusive cogni-
tions. These strategies have been labeled blunting (Miller, 1992), cognitive avoidance
(Foa & Kozak, 1986), distraction (Baum, 1987), and retrieval inhibition (Bjork, 1989),
to name but a few examples. To a certain extent, these concepts overlap with thought
suppression, due to the fact they all assume the existence of inhibitory mechanisms
that deactivate mental representations. Note, however, that there are also marked dif-
ferences between these concepts in whether or not a maladaptive (i.e., counterpro-
ductive) quality is ascribed to them. For example, Miller (1992) concluded that in
medical contexts, people who typically avoid threat-relevant information (“blunters”)
are often less distressed in response to health threats than are individuals who moni-
tor threat-relevant cues (“monitors”). There are even indications that during anticipa-
tion of a medical visit, monitors display a higher frequency of intrusive thoughts than
do blunters. However, whether blunting is an adaptive strategy depends on an array of
conditions (e.g., nature and type of medical intervention, short versus long-term con-
sequences of blunting). Findings such as these demonstrate that this research domain
would also profit from a refined taxonomy of avoidant strategies. One promising start-
ing point for such an endeavor is the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) devel-
oped by Wells and Davies (1994). The TCQ consists of 30 items that were derived
from a pool of avoidant strategies reported by anxiety disordered patients. More spe-
cifically, it covers 5 distinct maneuvers, namely distraction (e.g., “I keep myself busy”),
social coping (e.g., “I talk to a friend about the thought”), worrying (e.g., “I worry
about more minor things instead”), self-punishment (e.g., “I shout at myself for hav-
ing the thought”), and reappraisal (e.g., “I try a different way of thinking about it”). It
is highly unlikely that all these maneuvers have counterproductive effects that contrib-
ute to the persistence of psychopathology (e.g., Warda & Bryant, 1998).
With these preliminary remarks in mind, we see several promising research avenues
for future studies concerned with the links between thought suppression strategies
and psychopathology. To begin with, it would be interesting to evaluate in a systematic
fashion metacognitions about thought suppression strategies. Do people who engage
in such strategies believe that the mere act of suppression proves that a certain target
intrusion is less acceptable (e.g., Freeston et al., 1991)? Do they believe that certain
thought suppression strategies are useful in helping to find solutions and preventing
negative outcomes, as seems to be the case in pathological worrying (Dugas et al.,
1998)? How do these metacognition beliefs about thought suppression relate to its
counterproductive effects both within and outside the laboratory?
A second issue that warrants further study has to do with the complex interactions
between mood, cognitive intrusions, cognitive coping strategies, and types of psycho-
pathology. For example, some authors have found evidence to suggest that dysphoria
reduces the acceptability of certain intrusions (e.g., Reynolds & Salkovskis, 1992). In
this way, mood states may trigger thought suppression of the sort described by Weg-
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ner (i.e., active resistance) and this may give rise to obsessive ruminations (Freeston et
al., 1991; Rachman, 1978). Alternatively, the intrusions could elicit morbid preoccu-
pation (i.e., attentive thinking) of the type found in worriers (Rachman, 1978). Obvi-
ously, these complex interactions deserve further study.
A third issue pertains to the effects of thought suppression strategies on memory. As
things stand, it is unlikely that thought suppression strategies may account for disso-
ciative amnesia (cf. supra). However, it is perfectly possible that thought suppression
strategies have an impact on the formal characteristics of autobiographical memories.
Germane to this issue are studies concerned with the phenomenon of overgeneral-
ized memories which refers to the difficulty that some patients have in retrieving spe-
cific autobiographical memories (Williams, 1992, 1996). Overgeneralized memories
have been documented in patients with depression (e.g., Williams, 1992), patients
with PTSD (e.g., McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995), and patients with OCD
(e.g., Wilhelm, McNally, Baer, & Florin, 1997), but are not found in normal subjects
scoring high on neuroticism or depression (Merckelbach, Muris, & Horselenberg,
1996). A recurring theme in studies exploring the origins of overgeneral memories is
that these memories are tied to cognitive intrusions that occur against a background
of depressive mood (e.g., Wilhelm et al., 1997; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995). Avoidance
strategies directed at these intrusions could promote a general retrieval inhibition
(Kuyken & Brewin, 1995) and/or could consume excessive cognitive capacity (Wil-
helm et al., 1997). In either case, the result would be a relative inability to retrieve spe-
cific autobiographical memories. Perhaps, then, overgeneralized memories may be-
come so extensive and profound that they are experienced as dissociative amnesia. So
far, no study has looked specifically at the associations between intentional efforts to
avoid distressing memories, overgeneralized memories, and dissociative amnesia.
However, there is some indirect evidence suggesting that at least some persons who
report periods of amnesia for traumatic events, in fact, refer to intentional avoidance
of traumatic memories (Melchert & Parker, 1997). Germane to this issue is also a
study by Davis and Schwartz (1987) who found that repressors recall fewer negative
autobiographical memories than do controls (see, for a more detailed analysis, Men-
dolia, Moore, & Tesser, 1996). While such findings await replication, the co-occur-
rence of cognitive intrusions, depressive mood, avoidance strategies, and overgeneral
memories seems to be well established and so, it provides a good starting point for fur-
ther studies on the memory effects of thought suppression.
In sum, then, previous claims about the causal role of thought suppression in cer-
tain disorders have received little empirical support. Meanwhile, research on the
pathogenic potential of thought suppression strategies has been hindered by a lack of
detailed taxonomies of intrusive phenomena and avoidant strategies. To the extent
that such taxonomies become available, more sophisticated hypotheses about the
links between thought suppression strategies and psychopathology can be evaluated.
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